Walking Back Miranda Rights?

April 1, 2013

Daily Journal

"Walking Back Miranda Rights?" originally appeared in the April 1, 2013 issue of the Daily Journal.

The Supreme Court’s 1966 Miranda decision sought to provide a means to ensure that those whose freedom of action was in some way deprived had a means of protection from coerced, self-incriminating statements (a.k.a. the third degree). The court stated, “when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way, and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.” I couldn’t agree more. So why did the court back away from this reasoning in its most recent Miranda-warranting decision, Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2012)?

In 2001, Randall Lee Fields was in the custody of the Lenawee County Sheriff’s Department. On Dec. 23, a corrections officer escorted him from his cell to a conference room in the main area of the department. The escort did not advise him of where he was being taken or for what purpose. Fields was in his county-issued jumpsuit, but remained unchained. Once in the conference room, he was questioned by two deputies regarding his sexual relationship with a minor. At the beginning of the interview, Fields was told he was free to leave whenever he wanted. The door to the room was sometimes closed, but never locked. At some point Fields became agitated, yelling several times that he no longer wished to speak to the deputies. The deputies did not conclude the interview at that time. During the five to seven hours Fields was questioned, he admitted to engaging in sexual activities with the minor. At no time was he advised of his right to remain silent. At no time was he advised of his right to an attorney. At no time was he asked whether he understood his rights. The statements were admitted at trial, and Fields was convicted and sentenced.

The court held that Fields was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda. It stated that while it was sensitive to the realities of imprisonment, it believed that questioning an inmate does not involve the shock of initial arrest; that an inmate is unlikely to be lured into speaking by a longing for a prompt release; and that an inmate knows and understands law enforcement lacks the authority to affect the duration of his sentence. It reasoned that Fields was told he could leave and go back to his cell, the conference room was well lit and “not uncomfortable," he was offered food and water, the conference room door was sometimes left open, and that those objective facts were consistent with an interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave.

The court’s decision leaves a long-unanswered question: What then [is] custody for purposes of Miranda? The court has specifically stated that it has “repeatedly declined” to address this issue. This question cannot remain unanswered. If answered, the correct conclusion would be Miranda applies in Howes.

First, while it is understood that there can be a break in custodial interrogation, it goes without saying that when a person is incarcerated they are, and remain, in custody. The very nature of being incarcerated is a restraint of freedom, paired with deprivation of movement. Prisoners are escorted to and fro, directed when to be where, and do not enjoy the freedom of movement of persons not in custody.

Second, the court itself points out custodial questioning is “an inherently compelling pressure.” It does not then follow that a prisoner does not experience the same shock and pressures of coercion when undergoing questioning by law enforcement. To the contrary, Fields was restricted by the very nature of his incarceration. He was further restricted when the deputy escorted him to the conference room outside of his cell, away from the general population, and interrogated for the sole purpose of the investigation of a crime to determine whether he would “fess up.” He was with these officers for five to seven hours. It has no bearing that Fields was told he could leave when he wanted because, when he began to yell he no longer wished to speak with them, the deputies showed no intention of releasing him, did not advise him that he could have an attorney present, and did not advise him that he did not have to speak with them – presenting a fairly “exit free” and coercive environment.

Finally, whether the deputies had the authority to affect the duration of Fields' sentence is not quite accurate. Although law enforcement had no means to lengthen Fields' sentence on the matter he was incarcerated for, they absolutely had a means to affect his sentence by (1) questioning him regarding a crime he was alleged to have committed, (2) receiving incriminating statements identifying Fields as the perpetrator, (3) prosecuting him based on those statements and, (4) having the information received be material to his conviction. Here, we have all of the above. Appearing that all grounds are satisfied, it follows that Fields was in Miranda-warranting custody, and should have been advised of his rights.

The court seems to remain conflicted or, perhaps, unwilling to recognize the fact that this question must be answered. A bright-line rule must be issued for law enforcement to follow and arrestees, inmates, defendants and the like to be protected by. The danger in the former? A continuous flow of case-by-case studies where the court dances around the issue, leaving the privilege discretionary – which is not a privilege at all.