Fair Labor Standards Act: New Overtime Rules Take Effect

By: Michael J. Nunez

Changes to the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act, referred to by the Labor Department as the “FairPay” rules, went into effect on August 23, 2004. The law comes after decades of lobbying by business groups facing major lawsuits about overtime. Among those are: Wal-Mart, Starbucks, Radio Shack, Rite Aid and Bank of America. The Labor Department’s objective in advancing the new rules is an attempt to stop needless litigation by clarifying the rules on who’s entitled to overtime.

The revision of the Fair Labor Standards Act is expected to result in overtime wages for 1.3 million low-income, white-collar American workers who didn’t have it before. And it is expected to cause 107,000 highly-compensated workers to lose their rights to it.

The federal overtime laws have limited application to California. Employees of private companies are governed by California’s more restrictive labor laws. Yet, an estimated 2.3 million federal, state and local government employees in the state are subject to the federal law, although many of them are covered by union contracts that supersede it.

Overtime 101

The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act set the current standards for pay and overtime and covers about 115 million workers. That law requires employers to pay no less than minimum wage $5.15/hour for all hours worked. For every hour worked above 40 hours in single workweek, the law mandates that employers pay one-and-a-half times the regular rate of pay. But, that law has always had exemptions for certain professions and classes of workers (generally, salaried workers in executive, administrative, professional, outside sales and some computer jobs) – – meaning some employers do not have to pay time- and-a-half.

Who Gains Overtime Under New Law

Workers earning $23,660 or below automatically must receive overtime now. That raises the income bar. Previously, overtime was mandated only for workers who earned $8,060 or less.

Who Could Lose Overtime Under New Law

White-collar workers earning $100,000 or more a year. In addition, people from a number of professions identified as generally exempt from overtime: pharmacists, dental hygienists, physician assistants, accountants, chefs, athletic trainers with degrees or specialized training, computer system analysts, programmers and software engineers, funeral directors, embalmers, journalists, financial services industry workers, insurance claims adjusters, human resource managers, management consultants, executive and administrative assistants, purchasing agents and registered or certified medical technologists. Employers are told to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.

Nurses

Registered nurses who are paid on an hourly basis should receive overtime. Those who are paid on a salaried basis, earning more than $455 a week, no longer have to be paid overtime under federal law.

Emergency Workers and Unions

Emergency workers (including police, firefighters and rescue personnel) will continue to get overtime. The new law clearly states those workers cannot be exempted from overtime. Union workers covered by contracts will not be affected by the change. But organizers say the new rules will make bargaining more difficult when contracts come up for renewal.

Recent Trends in Elder Abuse Litigation

By: Dan L. Longo

Although the California Legislature formally recognized the increased susceptibility of the elderly and dependent adults to be abused or neglected more than 20 years ago, the Welfare and Institutions Code Section 15600, et seq, was not fully utilized by the plaintiff’s bar until the late 1990’s. The initial increase in cases filed under the “Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act” was clearly an attempt to circumvent the limitation on general damages under California’s MICRA statute. Recently we have begun to see these claims outside the traditional nursing home arena. In addition, the courts are continuing to expand the reach and effect of the statute.

The major advantage for plaintiffs is that the Act allows recovery for attorneys fees and allows the next of kin to recover pre-death pain and suffering damages that would otherwise be barred under California law, in addition to possible punitive damages. In order to recover the expanded remedies provided in the statute, the plaintiff must establish that the injured party was (1) a California resident; (2) over 65 years old, OR A DEPENDENT ADULT BETWEEN THE AGES OF 18-64; (3) the abuse must be shown to be either neglect, physical abuse or fiduciary/financial abuse; and (4) there must be recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of the abuse. Finally, the allegations must be proven by “clear and convincing evidence.”

There has been a dramatic increase in the number of cases filed on behalf of “dependent adults.” A dependent adult is anyone, ages 18-64, who has physical or mental limitations that prevent the carrying out of normal daily living activities. A dependent adult is further defined as “any person between the ages of 18-64 who is admitted as an inpatient to a 24 hour health facility. Clearly these definitions provide fertile ground for a clever plaintiff’s counsel to expand the pool of potential persons arguably covered by the Act. We can no longer assume that “Elder Abuse” applies only to the elderly nursing home patient.

A few examples of recent cases handled by our office illustrate the expansion of the statute. The first case involves what at first glance is a generic claim for legal malpractice. The plaintiff, a 66 year-old doctor, claimed that he was overcharged by his former lawyers. In addition, the plaintiff claimed remedies under the Act, alleging that the actions of his former lawyers, in over billing him, constituted “financial abuse” under the statute. Although we demurred to the Elder Abuse cause of action, the judge allowed the claim to stand at the pleading stage, notwithstanding the court’s statement that this appeared to be a “garden variety” legal malpractice claim, not elder abuse. Unfortunately, the ruling will make the case more difficult to resolve short of trial because both plaintiff and his counsel continue to have unrealistic aspirations as far as the potential heightened remedies under the statute are concerned.

The second case concerned a 27 year-old woman who voluntarily checked herself into a psychiatric facility. Once there, she continued to carry on a rather active sex life with her boyfriend. Upon becoming pregnant, she sued the facility, claiming, among other things, dependent adult abuse. Through discovery, we were able to show that the claim lacked merit and to dispense with the claim for nuisance value. We have also seen “Elder Abuse” claims in the context of bad faith litigation, landlord tenant disputes and homeowner association claims.

A recent California Appellate Court case, Norman v.Life Care Centers of America 107 Cal.App. 4th 1233 (2003), provided more ammunition to the plaintiff’s bar for prosecution of these claims. In Norman, plaintiff sued individually and as successor in interest for her deceased 87 year-old mother, (the patient). The patient was admitted to the defendant’s skilled nursing facility on January 16, 1999. Her initial fall risk assessment reflected a “moderate” risk for falls, with call alarm, low bed position, and side rails up ordered. Over the next three weeks, the patient attempted to climb out of bed on several occasions and suffered at least four falls. After each fall, additional precautions were taken, ultimately leading to physical restraints as of February 8,1999, after a serious fall which resulted in numerous injuries. On June 4,1999, the patient died while residing in another facility.

Plaintiff sued for elder abuse and wrongful death. After a lengthy trial, the jury found for the defense. On appeal, plaintiff argued that a requested instruction on negligence per se should have been given. The appellate court, citing evidence that the defendants violated Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations regarding patient rights, agreed and sent the case back for retrial. In its ruling, the court stated: “Based on our consideration of the entire record, we conclude that it is reasonably probable plaintiff would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the trial court=s error in refusing to instruct on negligence per se.” A petition for review is currently pending with the Supreme court.

The reasons that this ruling is distressing are twofold. First, the opinion assumes that all of the testimony regarding the Department of Health Services investigation is admissible. Previously, defense counsel had fought long and hard to keep evidence of DHS violations out of evidence because of their obvious prejudicial impact. Second, almost every elder abuse case will provide skilled plaintiff’s counsel with a violation of one of the Title 22 regulations, no matter how trivial. Allowing plaintiffs to shift the burden of proof to the defendants via a negligence per se instruction will make obtaining a defense verdict at trial that much more difficult. We will continue to monitor this case closely to see if it is either de-published, or accepted for review.

Supreme Court Holds That 10-Year Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Actions in CCP § 337.15 is not Subject to Equitable Tolling While Promises to Repair

By: Edmund G. Farrell, III

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15, all actions for latent defects in construction must be brought within ten years after substantial completion of the project. Courts of Appeal in California have split over whether the ten-year period is tolled while defendants’ promises to repair the subject defects are pending. On August 4, 2003, the California Supreme Court settled this dispute by holding that the ten-year period is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. The ten-year statute continues to run even while defendants’ promises to repair are pending and unresolved.

However, the Court did hold that a defendant may be equitably estopped from asserting the ten-year statute of limitations if plaintiff proves the following: (1) defendant represents, while the limitation period is still running, that all actionable damage has been or will be repaired thus making it unnecessary to sue, (2) the plaintiff reasonably relies on this representation to refrain from bringing a timely action, (3) the representation proves false after the limitations period has expired, and (4) the plaintiff proceeds diligently once the truth is discovered. If plaintiff meets these four factors, a complaint can be brought after the ten-year statute of limitations has expired. However, the defendants’ mere failure to do promised repairs is insufficient to establish that defendants’ conduct “actually and reasonably induced plaintiffs to forbear suing within the 10-year period of section 337.15.” Plaintiffs must establish that defendants’ conduct directly prevented them from filing a timely action.

In sum, the Supreme Court held that the ten-year statute of limitations is not “equitably tolled” while defendants’ promises to repair are pending. The statute keeps running. However, if defendants’ conduct actually induces plaintiffs to forbear suing within the ten-year period, the defendants can be “equitably estopped” from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.

The New “110-Day Barrier” on Motions for Summary Judgment

By: Daniel G. Pezold

Changes to the Code Civil Procedure’s requirements affecting Motions for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication took effect on January 1, 2003. Those changes, which include a new “110 Day Barrier” on filing and serving dispositive motions, have a direct impact on the defense of a complaint.

Previously, C.C.P. Section 437c(a) required that a notice of motion be served 28 days before the hearing on the motion, plus five days for mailing, with the hearing scheduled no later than 30 days before trial or – 63 days before trial. Now, a notice of motion must be served 75 days before the hearing on the motion, plus five days for mailing, with the hearing scheduled no later than 30 days before trial or – 110 days before trial.

Because there were no corresponding changes to C.C.P. Section 437c with regard to the due date of the opposition papers (e.g., opposition papers are still due 14 days before the hearing on the motion) the opposing party now has two months (61 days) to prepare its opposition rather than two weeks (14 days). In addition, C.C.P. Section 437c(h) now provides that on or before the date the opposition is due, the opposing party may apply to the court by ex parte application to continue the hearing on the motion to obtain additional discovery. These changes are particularly onerous because the opposition now has time to analyze the moving papers, propound discovery, notice and take depositions all directed at defeating the motion by obtaining responses and or testimony that can be used to dispute material facts contained in the separate statement.

Given a trial court’s propensity to set trial dates within one year of the filing of the complaint, combined with changes to C.C.P. Section 437c, effective defenses targeted toward summary judgment/adjudication must necessarily be conducted at an accelerated yet well planned pace. This, in turn, means that defense counsel and the client need to work more closely together to ensure that the “110 Day Barrier” for service of a dispositive motion does not arrive before the discovery essential to the motion has been obtained.

One way to work more effectively with the new “110 Day Barrier” is for defense counsel and the client to try and reach early agreement regarding a litigation and discovery plan. Documents in the clients possession, e.g., claim file, not yet in counsel’s possession should be identified and forwarded to counsel. Discussions and consensus regarding the filing of demurrers and motions to strike, or other responsive pleadings; first sets of written discovery including document subpoenas; and, setting and taking initial depositions, should ideally take place within the first sixty days when feasible.

During the next sixty days, counsel and the client can then consider and discuss the results of any motions filed, responses to discovery received, and deposition testimony obtained. At this point, the discovery plan can be refined, identifying and reaching agreement as to additional document subpoenas, written discovery, and depositions needed to obtain the evidence to support a dispositive motion. A determination can also be made with regard to whether any motions to compel are needed with respect to the first sets of discovery responses and depositions.

During the third sixty day period, counsel and the client can discuss whether or not the evidence to support a dispositive motion has been obtained, whether to move forward with preparation of a motion, or whether any motions to compel further responses or deposition testimony are needed.

By making efforts to work closely together at the early stages of litigation, defense counsel and the client have the ability to soften the impact of the “110 Day Barrier.” Of course, each case must be analyzed according to its unique circumstances. In some circumstances, because informal resolution is deemed likely or desired, immediately serving discovery demands and deposition notices may not be the most effective approach. When making decisions as to how to best proceed, the new “110 Day Barrier” should not be overlooked, particularly given the additional time the opposing party has to analyze dispositive motions and obtain discovery specifically directed at defeating such motions.

Tips for Defending and Traps to Avoid in Representing Nursing Homes

By: Dan L. Longo

It is no surprise to anyone that Elder Abuse/Nursing Home litigation is on the rise. There are several reasons for the increase in this type of litigation over the last five years. First, largely fueled by the media, there is a public perception that nursing homes do not provide adequate care to their patients. Second, our population in general lives longer and therefore more people are available to become patients in the ever-expanding nursing home industry. Third, the current statutory framework strongly favors plaintiffs in Elder Abuse/Nursing Home litigation. Finally, enterprising and highly capable plaintiff attorneys have seized on the first three points to fuel the explosion in Elder Abuse/Nursing Home litigation. Below are five tips for the defense of nursing home litigation and five traps to avoid.

FIVE TIPS FOR THE DEFENSE

1. ATTACK THE COMPLAINT
Allegations relating to want on and willful misconduct, violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200, and, of course, punitive damages should be challenged if at all possible. The goal is to limit the available remedies and limit the theories on which plaintiff might proceed.

2. MEET WITH THE FACILITY STAFF EARLY AND OFTEN
It is vitally important to visit the facility as early as possible in the litigation. This allows defense counsel to get the “lay of the land” and also to meet with the staff members who had both direct and indirect responsibility for patient care – administrator, and director of nursing, as well as the charge nurse, certified nursing assistant, dietician, physical therapist, and anyone else who had direct patient contact. An initial meeting will allow counsel to size up witnesses, determine potential “weak links” and identify persons most knowledgeable for deposition at a later date. This initial visit should also be used to obtain all of the pertinent documents such as policy and procedure manuals, and reports related to facility staffing, as well as the patient’s chart.

3. OBTAIN ALL OF THE PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORDS
Counsel too often focuses on the records from the particular facility being represented. However, especially in elder cases, all of the medical records should be obtained, both prior to entering the facility and after leaving the facility, if any such records exist. These records help track the progression of any ongoing disease processes concerning the patient’s health and will provide needed information for expert testimony. This information may also provide additional parties for inclusion and sharing in any potential exposure.

4. RETAIN EXPERTS EARLY
Consideration should be given to which particular fields will require expert testimony. Generally, experts will be needed in the following areas:

  1. Expert on nursing home administration;
  2. A nurse expert in working in skilled nursing facilities;
  3. Appropriate medical specialists concerning the particular medical issues in question (i.e., cardiologist, urologist, etc.)

Retaining experts early will greatly assist counsel in developing theories of defense and prevent the dreaded scrambling for experts as trial approaches. Further, the experts can assist counsel in formulating discovery requests as the case progresses in order to ensure that the experts have all the information they need to opine on the appropriate issues at trial.

5. USE MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUES TO YOUR CLIENT’S ADVANTAGE
Plaintiffs’ counsel often focus on the issues of abuse and neglect, believing that those will carry the day for them with the jury. While issues of abuse and neglect are obvious concerns, the issue of medical causation is often one that provides a viable avenue for obtaining a defense verdict. Again, this is an area where expert testimony can be extremely beneficial for the defense especially when dealing with the common nursing home issues of falls and pressure ulcers.

FIVE TRAPS TO AVOID ON THE ROAD TO A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE

1. AVOID ALLOWING YOUR CLIENTS’ OWN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO SET THE STANDARD OF CARE.
Plaintiffs’ counsel will inevitably seek production of the facility’s policies and procedures manual. While such documents are most likely discoverable, their admission into evidence at trial should be challenged. The standard of care is to be determined by expert testimony, not by whether or not your client met the requirements of its own policies and procedures. It may well be that the policies and procedures set requirements that are far above the actual “standard of care.”

2. AVOID “OVER TASKING” THE FACILITY STAFF.
A typical tactic of plaintiffs’ counsel at depositions is to attempt to take a normal 8 hour working shift and break it up into individual component tasks that the caregiver is to undertake during any particular day. The caregiver obviously tries to be generous in time allocation for such tasks as feeding, bathing, massaging, etc. As such, when taking into account the number of patients to be dealt with, plaintiffs’ counsel can easily take that 8 hour shift and place 12 hours worth of “tasks” within that shift, thereby creating an argument that the staff is overburdened. Careful preparation of the staff for deposition, including an analysis and breakdown of the individual tasks on a daily basis, can prepare the staff member for this slight of hand tactic at a deposition.

3. DO NOT ALLOW A DISGRUNTLED FORMER EMPLOYEE TO AFFECT THE CASE.
At the time of the initial meeting with the administrator, determine if there are any disgruntled former employees who might have any particular information concerning the patient. Ask to see the personnel records of all employees who worked with the patient in order to determine any potential “turncoat” employees before they are able to do any damage. If a disgruntled former employee is identified who may potentially be a problem, attempt to meet with that person early on to see if you can bring him or her back into the fold.

Given the nature of the turnover in the industry, there will always be former employees who had contact with any given patient. Identifying the reason the employee left voluntarily (or was terminated) and dealing with the former employee concerning that issue or issues head on, can go a long way toward ameliorating any concern for damage that the former employee might inflict. Further, if these efforts prove unsuccessful, a potential danger source in the case can at least be identified and dealt with as the case progresses through testimony of other current and former employees.

4. AVOID FIGHTING LOSING BATTLES WITH THE TRIAL JUDGE.
If at all possible, avoid being on the losing side of such things as motions to compel discovery responses, and motions for protective orders. In general, trial courts believe in full and complete disclosure during the discovery process. Admissibility at trial is another matter. Defense counsel is much better served by producing non privileged documents rather than interpreting an objection, which the trial judge will more than likely overrule. Rather, save the battle for the admissibility of that particular document at trial at which time the court will be more predisposed to listening to arguments on admissibility. Appearing unreasonable to the judge regarding discovery motions carries over to the trial and may adversely affect counsel’s ability to win the court over on important pre trial motions.

5. BE OFFENSIVE, NOT DEFENSIVE.
The old saying that the best defense is a good offense was never truer than in defending nursing home claims. Defense counsel must be aggressive from voir dire to closing arguments, stressing the strong points of the case (i.e., there was no abuse, there was no neglect, there was no medical causation). In addition, make sure that any bad evidence in the case, which you know is going to come out anyway, is brought out by you as opposed to plaintiffs’ counsel, thereby showing the jury that defense counsel is going to be upfront regarding all the issues in the case. Trying the case from your toes, and not from your heels, shows confidence in your client, confidence in your case, and confidence in the verdict.

Understanding the Americans with Disabilities Act

By: Robert H. Panman

Although all Titles of the ADA strive to elimination of discrimination against persons with disabilities, each Title has different rules, regulations, affirmative defenses and remedies available to plaintiffs. Title I governs employment situations, Title II governs public entities and Title III governs access to public accommodations and services.

Employers Do Not Violate ADA Where An Employees’ Disability Poses A Direct Threat To His Own Health

Although Title I of the ADA protects disabled persons from job discrimination, it provides that employers “may include a requirement that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.” The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) expanded this to allow employers to screen out potential workers whose disabilities created a risk on the job to the employees’ own health or safety. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 2002 DJDAR 6379, the United States Supreme Court held that this EEOC regulation was permissible.

There, plaintiff worked for an independent contractor at an oil refinery owned by Chevron. He applied for a job directly with Chevron, who agreed to hire him if he passed a physical examination. Because Plaintiff’s examination showed liver damage caused by Hepatitis C, Chevron withdrew its employment offer after its doctor said plaintiff’s condition would worsen with continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. Chevron also asked the contractor to reassign plaintiff to a job where there was no exposure to harmful chemicals or to remove plaintiff from the refinery altogether. When the contractor laid plaintiff off, plaintiff filed suit alleging that Chevron violated the ADA by refusing to hire him and let him continue to work at the refinery on account of his liver condition.

The District Court granted summary judgment for Chevron based on the EEOC regulation, which was reversed by the 9th Circuit. The United Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the 9th Circuit and finding the EEOC regulation applicable to ADA claims.

Plaintiff Need Not Attempt To Gain Access To Premises To Have Standing Under Americans With Disabilities Act

In Pickern v. Doran, 2002 DJDAR 6829, an architectural barrier ADA case, the Ninth Circuit recently held that, (1) where a disabled person has actual knowledge of illegal barriers, plaintiff need not attempt to gain access to premises if such an attempt would be futile, and (2) so long as plaintiff visits the premises a year before he files suit, his action is timely. Plaintiff, a paraplegic who used a wheelchair, alleged that he could not go shopping at a particular grocery store due to inadequate access to and from the parking lot, the check-stands, restrooms and vending machines. Plaintiff admitted that the first time he was aware of the alleged illegal barriers was prior to 1998 while visiting his grandmother, and that he visited the store only once again in late 1998.

On appeal to the 9th Circuit, the court held that the plain language of the ADA does not require a disabled person “. . . to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization . . . does not intend to comply” with the ADA. Accordingly, under ADA, once a plaintiff is aware of discriminatory conditions at a place of public accommodation and is deterred from visiting the accommodation, plaintiff need not have personally encountered all of the barriers barring access to seek an injunction to remove those barriers. Such a plaintiff has suffered an “actual harm” and, thus, has standing to sue. The 9th Circuit also found that plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief for any injury occurring within the limitations period, as well as for “threatened future injury”. Because plaintiff stated that, at the time he filed his complaint, he was aware of barriers to access that continued to exist at the store and that the barriers currently deter him, his lawsuit was not time-barred.

United States Supreme Court Rules On Availability Of Punitive Damages Under The Americans With Disabilities Act And Rehabilitation Act

In Barnes v. Gorman, 2002 DJDAR 6713, the US Supreme Court held that punitive damages are not available to plaintiffs in ADA suits brought under Section 202 of the ADA (prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals by public entities) or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (prohibiting discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal funding), noting that these statutes apply only to public entities and programs which are the recipients of federal funding. In this matter from the 8th Circuit, after reviewing these ADA statutes in connection with cases which invoke Congress’ power under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, the court found that because Spending Clause legislation is in the nature of a contract, the scope of damages is likewise contractual and punitive damages are not available for breach of contract claims. Thus, no punitive damages are recoverable for violations of these particular statutes.

Here, Plaintiff, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, was arrested after fighting with a bouncer at a nightclub. The arresting police removed plaintiff from his wheelchair and used a seatbelt to strap him to a narrow bench in the rear of their van. Fearing that the seatbelt placed excessive pressure on his urine bag, plaintiff released his seatbelt causing him to fall to the floor, injuring his shoulder and back and resulting in his inability to work. Plaintiff sued members of the police commission, the officer who drove the van and the chief of police claiming they had discriminated against him by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transport of disabled persons. The jury awarded one million dollars in compensatory damages and 1.2 million in punitive damages, which punitive damages were disallowed by the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Ethical Issues in the Use of Trial Consultants

The Role of Trial Consultants

Civil trial attorneys today increasingly turn to an empirically-based approach to jury selection as opposed to intuiting or speculating about a juror’s personal biases and attitudes. Though it is difficult to measure the results of this approach with any precision, the consensus of both plaintiff and defense trial attorneys is that use of trial consultants can yield successful results. Trial consultants offer a variety of services that are directed at anticipating or shaping a trial result. Such services include opening statement consultation, community attitude surveys, damage award assessment, jury instruction review, and the following:

B. Focus Groups – A focus group, drawn from the area where the case is pending, is given one or two issues to consider in order to assess the response. For example, a closing statement may be simulated for participants who will then be divided into response groups and questioned in detail as to factors shaping their decision. More flexible and less expensive than a mock trial, a focus group will segregate relevant from irrelevant facts. Here again, jury science allows for scientific analysis of the data gathered and the expert application of that data.

C. Jury Questionnaires – While voir dire is an excellent tool, it is limited in its ability to obtain underlying, probing information, especially since a roomful of prospective jurors is watching the process along with the judge and counsel. Since questionnaires are often lengthy and detailed in contextual relation to the trial issues, they garner invaluable insight into the profile of prospective jurors. In this circumstance, jury science will provide its greatest benefit in drafting and interpreting the responses, as well as framing strategic follow-up questions to elicit the most relevant information.

D. Jury Selection – Jury selection presents the most traditional venue for the trial consultant. Even if attorneys choose to rely on their own beliefs and biases, these are only probative if they are scientifically confirmed. In jury selection, it is impossible to know which jurors should be rejected unless a party is first aware of the people to seek. While demographics play a role in creating the profile of a prospective juror, other scientifically-based factors may be more important, depending on the issues to be litigated.

E. Juror Surveillance – Despite its intrusive nature and high price, juror surveillance can allow the attorney to independently verify the truth of voir dire responses. Surveillance can also provide the trial consultant with valuable information that cannot be gleaned from other practices in arriving at a jury profile. Unlike voir dire, the subject is unencumbered by the cloak of appearance or a socially acceptable facade that masks reality during surveillance.

Do Trial Consultants Really Work?

A significant benefit offered by jury science is its ability to help attorneys filter dishonest answers by potential jurors during voir dire. Many studies have shown that people tend to provide socially acceptable answers when questioned before an authority figure, like a judge or trial counsel, in an effort to conceal or deny their inherent prejudices. By demographically correlating attitudes related to the trial, obtained from questionnaires and in-person interviews, attorneys can remove potential jurors during the voir dire process whom they believe are masking their true biases.

While no significant empirical evidence validates a correlation between juror characteristics and a consistent bias favoring one party, jury science employs tools that reach into the mindset of jurors using scientific analyses of gathered information. The outcome will depend on the nature and extent of litigation, but the tools can help to formulate a plan from voir dire through closing arguments. Trial consultants are able to examine the courtroom demeanor of prospective jurors during the entire selection process and apply psychological theory to physical cues, both verbal and non-verbal. Armed with this interpretive information, pinpoint accuracy replaces guesswork, and persuasive representation replaces speculation. Such expertly wielded tools can make the difference in high stakes litigation.

Ethical Concerns

Some detractors have argued that unequal access to consulting services poses an ethical concern. The challenge that jury science and its high cost runs afoul of the United States Constitution’s impartiality mandate when only one side can afford access to consultant services merits some consideration.

In effect, however, what is unfair about trial consulting is a metaphor for what is unfair about the adversarial system itself. The mismatch in litigant resources results in a mismatch of affordable professional services across the board. If this argument is accepted, the impartiality mandate would necessarily apply to hiring the best legal counsel, expert witnesses, conducting sub rosa investigations, and employing the use of pricey visual graphics, etc. The challenge of a level playing field could be lodged against any and all trial-related services. While the task of the trial consultant is providing research and advice, the jury has the final word.

Fortunately, the internet offers on-line research services, such as virtual focus groups, at a fraction of the cost. On-line research can yield large sample sizes consisting of demographics that truly mirror the actual jury pool. In addition to being cost-effective, the trial consultant or attorney who uses internet technology can compile data from a wide variety of cross-sections or areas across the world, eliminating the need for travel to different geographic locations. Thus, trial consulting may be accessible to a wider pool of litigants than simply those who are most affluent.

A second argument offers that if trial consulting is so effective as to significantly impact jury composition, it may violate the constitutional right to an impartial jury. If jury science is able to dictate the outcome of a trial by facilitating the choice of a perfect jury, it tramples upon constitutional principles that should be immediately addressed. To date, no court has heard such challenges.

Some opponents of jury science have argued that when selecting jurors, employing invidious stereotypes is inherently part of the trial consultant’s business. Even more disturbing, consultants add scientific validity to these harmful stereotypes. On the other hand, jury science causes some attorneys to abandon the use of antiquated stereotypes in selecting a jury. For example, detailed research of one particular community revealed that education level or books read were more relevant to the defense than membership in a particular class or race.

oreover, the trial consulting industry is presently unregulated. Any individual or group can enter the field and identify themselves as trial consultants. To require the licensing and regulation of trial consultants would necessitate a regulatory body that would, inevitably, drive up the price of services. Yet it is difficult to assess the level at which the industry should be regulated when there is still conjecture about the extent to which jury science has any impact on trial outcomes.

Conclusion

On the one hand, jury science assumes that jurors are incapable of drawing conclusions based upon evidence that they process at trial. Use of jury science addresses that concern by working to select a jury with a certain predisposition, or to instill that disposition at trial. On the other hand, jury science preserves impartiality by ensuring that hidden biases and prejudices are exposed so that they will not dictate the outcome of trial proceedings. In that regard, jury science counters archaic stereotypes and replaces them with scientific demographic analyses. Society benefits by having racist and often malevolent stereotypes removed from the trial. Ultimately, it is a litigant’s right and a lawyer’s duty to enlist all legal means to bring a favorable result at trial. Any restrictions to the hiring of trialconsultants, therefore, should be prohibited.

“Passing the Buck”: Focus on Addtional Insured Issues

By: Nancy N. Potter

Murchison & Cumming were again honored to speak at the 2003 West Coast Casualty Conference held in Anaheim, California. James Carraway, Bryan M. WeissNancy N. Potter and Carolyn A. Mathews, rounded out the panel, bringing light additional insureds issues through their presentation entitled “Passing the Buck”.

Starting off the presentation, Carolyn Mathews provided an overview of additional insured defense and how both sides can be more productive if they “play fair”. Although her handout materials discuss A.I. endorsements, Nancy Potter provided her “Top 10 List” of ways to get recalcitrant A.I. carriers to the bargaining table, which included bringing Krispy Kreme Donuts to the meeting! James Carraway, the Partner-in-charge of the firm’s Nevada office, discussed A.I. issues as they pertain to Nevada, providing examples of cases he has recently handled. Bryan Weiss, a partner in the firm’s Insurance Law Practice Group, wrapped up the presentation by discussing recent cases impacting additional insured issues, specifically highlighting the Golden Eagle case that arguably diminishes the application of the Presley case, which is regularly referenced by attorneys in their tender letters.

Excerpts from their handout materials are below.

Murchison & Cumming attorneys regularly serve as speakers at seminars. Our attorneys also provide private in-house seminars for clients, on topics of interest to clients. To arrange for a private seminar at your company’s office with any of Murchison & Cumming’s attorneys or to request our attorneys speak on a program, please contact Arleen Milian at (213) 623-7400 or amilian@murchisonlaw.com

 

The Buck’s First Stop
Language of the Policy

By:  Nancy Potter

    1. ADDITIONAL INSURED ENDORSEMENTS

        1. The 2009 Endorsement
            1. Terms:
          2009
          1993
          Who Is An Insured (Section II) is amended to include as an insured the person or organization (called “additional insured”) shown in the Schedule but only with respect to liability arising out of:

          1. Your ongoing operations performed for the additional insured(s) at the location designated above; or
          2. Acts or omissions of the additional insured(s) in connection with their general supervision of such operations…
          2009
          03/97
          Who Is An Insured (Section II) is amended to include as an insured the person or organization (called “additional insured”) shown in the Schedule but only with respect to liability arising out of:

            1. Your ongoing operations performed for the additional insured(s) at the location designated above; or
            2. Acts or omissions of the additional insured(s) in connection with their general supervision of such operations. …
            3. Additional Exclusions
              1. “Bodily injury” or “property damage” for which the additional insured(s) are obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does not apply to liability for damages that the additional insured(s) would have in the absence of the contract or agreement.
              2. “Bodily injury” or “property damage” occurring after:
                1. All work, including materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work, on the project (other than service, maintenance or repairs) to be performed by or on behalf of the additional insured(s) at the site of the completed operations has been completed; or
                2. That portion of “your work” out of which the injury or damage arises has been put to its intended use …
              3. “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of any act or omission of the additional insured(s) or any of their “employees” other than general supervision by the additional insured(s) of your ongoing operations performed for the additional insured(s).
              4. “Property damage” to:
                1. Property owned, used or occupied by or rented to the additional insured(s);
                2. Property in the care, custody or control of the additional insured(s) or over which the additional insured(s) are for any purpose exercising physical control; or
                3. Any work, including materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work, which is performed for the additional insured(s) by you.

          This insurance does not apply to:

            1. A 2009 does not cover completed operations, which is the major source of liability in construction defect cases.
            1. The 3/97 version of the 2009 endorsement goes on to exclude coverage for contractual liability (i.e., insured contracts.)
            1. Some subcontracts specify the acceptable form of endorsement. If they do specify, 2009’s will seldom be satisfactory. If you represent a G.C., you should make sure the contract specifies that the A.I. endorsement contain terms such as those on a 2010 Endorsement.
        1. The 2010 Endorsement

            1. Terms of the 11/85 Version, titled “ADDITIONAL INSURED – OWNERS, LESSEES OR CONTRACTORS (FORM B)”
          2010
          11/85
          WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured the person or organization shown in the Schedule, but only with respect to liability arising out of “your work” for that insured by or for you.
            1. This is the “standard” form of A.I endorsement and is frequently specified as the acceptable form of additional insured endorsement. While it may not, itself, allow you to pass the buck, it at least makes somebody share the burden.
            1. The 3/97 Version of the 2010 Endorsement
          2010
          03/97
          WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured the person or organization shown in the Schedule, but only with respect to liability arising out of your ongoing operations performed for that insured.
            1. The 3/97 Version of the 2010 Endorsement (as well as the 1993 version) provides coverage only for ongoing operations, and not for completed operations. Therefore, like the 2009, they may not be acceptable to G.C.’s who are meticulously documenting their insurance rights.
        1. Blanket A.I. Endorsements

            1. A blanket A.I. endorsement can be manuscripted to clarify the exact risk undertaken (such as excluding architects’ and engineers’ professional services) or that the insurer’s agent has been given notice of the increased risk (by, for example, requiring that a Certificate of Insurance have been issued.) Generally, the concept is that if the insured agrees in writing to make another party an A.I., the other party is automatically an A.I.
          SAMPLE:
          Section II – Who Is An Insured is amended to add: Any person or organization who you become obligated to include as an additional insured under this policy, as a result of any contract or agreement you enter into, excluding contracts or agreements for professional services, which requires you to furnish insurance to that person or organization of the type provided by this policy, but only with respect to liability arising out of your operations or premises owned by or rented to you. However, the insurance provided will not exceed the lesser of:

          1. The coverage and/or limits of this policy, or
          2. The coverage and/or limits required by said contract or agreement.
            1. The risk for the subcontractor’s insurer is in not knowing how many subcontracts its named insured has entered into. Some blanket A.I. endorsements include language specifically stating that contracts entered into both before and after policy inception provide blanket A.I. coverage to the G.C. Have these insurers really performed an underwriting investigation sufficient to determine what they are taking on through such a blanket endorsement?
        1. “Primary” Language

            1. Many subcontracts require that the subcontractor’s policy provide that it is primary to the G.C. ’s own policy. If the coverage is modified in compliance with the subcontract, the buck has been passed off to others. Frequently, this does not happen, probably because the specific requirements are not conveyed by the subcontractor to its broker, or from the broker to the insurer. Some G.C.s are careful enough to check and require that the proper form of 2010 endorsement be manuscripted to provide that the additional insurance is primary to the G.C.’s own coverage.
            1. Without “primary” language, arguably, coverage is governed by the “Other Insurance” clause of the policies. “Other insurance” clauses generally provide, absent other endorsements, that all of the insurance at the same level (e.g., all primary insurance for the G.C. and all A.I.’s) contributes according to equal shares.
            1. G.C.s can protect their own policy limits by endorsements to their policies providing that A.I. coverage is primary. For example, Endorsement CG 00 55 03 97 provides in pertinent part:
            1. Other Insurance
                1. Excess Insurance
                  1. Any other primary insurance available to you covering liability for damages arising out of the premises or operations for which you have been added as an additional insured by attachment of an endorsement.
                This insurance is excess over: …

          When this insurance is excess, we will have no duty under COVERAGES A or B to defend the insured against any “suit” if any other insurer has a duty to defend the insured against that “suit.” If no other insurer defends, we will undertake to do so, but we will be entitled to the insured’s rights against all those other insurers.

            1. The subcontractor’s insurer would be well advised to obtain Declarations pages, at a minimum, from the G.C.’s policies in order to determine whether the G.C.’s policy is also obligated to contribute to the defense, or whether it is all up to the A.I.’s.
            1. Some G.C.s are choosing to either go without CGL coverage, or to have a substantial Self-Insured Retention (SIR). The terms of that SIR may be important to the additional insurer because, depending on the language, payments by the additional insurer on behalf of the G.C. may or may not satisfy the SIR.
        1. The Certificate Of Insurance – That And A Dime. …

            1. The Certificate says on its face: “THIS CERTIFICATE IS ISSUED AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS UPON THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. THIS CERTIFICATE DOES NOT AMEND, EXTEND, OR ALTER THE COVERAGE AFFORDED BY THE POLICIES BELOW.”
            1. The Certificate also states: “THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE POLICIES OF INSURANCE LISTED BELOW HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE INSURED NAMED ABOVE FOR THE POLICY PERIOD INDICATED. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY REQUIREMENT, TERMS OR CONDITION OF ANY CONTRACT OR OTHER DOCUMENT WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THIS CERTIFICATE MAY BE ISSUED OR MAY PERTAIN, THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THE POLICIES DESCRIBED HEREIN IS SUBJECT TO ALL THE TERMS, EXCLUSIONS AND CONDITIONS OF SUCH POLICIES. LIMITS SHOWN MAY HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY PAID CLAIMS.”
            1. It is not enough for the G.C. to be identified as a Certificate Holder. All that means is that the subcontractor has a policy. The Certificate must state that the Certificate Holder is an A.I. If the insurer’s agent is doing its job properly, the Certificate will state that the G.C. “is an additional insured but only with respect to claims or damage at [name of project or address].”
            1. Sometimes, a Certificate of Insurance is issued, but the appropriate information is never conveyed by the agent to the insurer. When a claim is made, the insurer declines based on lack of an A.I. endorsement, and time is wasted establishing an A.I. obligation.
            1. Arguably, a Certificate issued and signed by the insurer’s authorized agent is an admission that the insurer has an A.I. obligation to the holder. Make sure, therefore, that if a physical copy of the A.I. endorsement is not available, the Certificate is signed by the insurer’s agent, not just the subcontractor’s broker. An agent can bind the insurer, a broker cannot.
            1. Note also that although you may be able to prove there was some commitment to provide A.I. coverage, the Certificate generally does not identify the form of the A.I. endorsement. What if no physical copy of the endorsement was ever generated? Depending on its usual underwriting practice, the insurer may be able to prove that it only issued 2009’s, and thus, had no obligation to defend the G.C. in a construction defect case.
        1. Many G.C.s are satisfied with a Certificate of Insurance stating that the G.C. is a Certificate Holder or A.I. under the subcontractor’s policy. Unless the G.C. has a Blanket A.I. endorsement, which says that anyone with a contract and a Certificate is an A.I., accepting just a Certificate of Insurance is fraught with problems.

 

    1. The right form of A.I. endorsement is like a winning lottery ticket. The wrong form may seem more like Monopoly money. Too many general contractors don’t know which they have until they are sued.

 

    1. THE POLICY GIVETH AND THE POLICY TAKETH AWAY

        1. Effect Of “Montrose” Endorsements
        1. The California Supreme Court’s

      Montrose

        1.  decision (

      Montrose Chemical Corporation v. Admiral Insurance

        1.  (1995) 10 Cal.4th 645) was intended to require all insurers who covered a risk during a period of continuous and progressive damage to defend and indemnify the insured. As soon as

      Montrose

        1.  was handed down, insurers began developing endorsements, which limited their duty to defend and indemnify to those claims arising within a more controllable time period.

      Montrose

        1.  endorsements are less of an issue for additional insureds. The insurer on the risk at the time of construction will nearly always owe a duty to defend. (

      Century Indemnity v. Hearrean

        1.  case (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 734;

      Pepperell v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.

        1.  (1998) 62 Cal. App.4th 1045, 1054.) Policies which were issued to subcontractors after the completion of construction, which is the time period to which Montrose endorsements generally apply, are less likely to provide A.I. coverage to the G.C. for the completed project anyway.
        1. Effect Of “Somebody Else’s Problem” Endorsements
            1. Examples
          If other valid and collectible insurance is available to any insured for a loss we cover under Coverage A or B of this Coverage Part, then this insurance is excess of such insurance and we will have no duty to defend any claim or “suit” that any other insurer has a duty to defend.
          * * *
          The insurance afforded by this policy is excess insurance in excess of the Self-Insured Retention or any other valid and collectible insurance available to the Insured, whichever is greater.
          1. Unless and until a Court rules that these provisions render coverage illusory, additional insurers who have such language in their policies will not have to defend, or participate in the defense of, the additional insured.
        1. The G.C. seeking a defense from all of its additional insurers is more likely to be limited by policy provisions, which foist all loss and duty to defend off on other insurers.
        1. Other Exclusions
          • condominium / town home/ tract home exclusions
          • water intrusion exclusions
          • mold damage exclusions
        1. Some policies are being written now with:
        1. If the G.C. is genuinely concerned about assuring sufficient coverage, it will have to familiarize itself with all of the unique exclusions on each subcontractor’s policy. All but the largest G.C.s have neither the capacity nor the interest in doing these pre-construction coverage analyses, and as a result, the G.C. will usually find out exactly what A.I. coverage it can count on only after the claim has been made or suit filed.

 

    1. It is not uncommon for an insurer to acknowledge that it is an additional insurer, and then note that it does not owe a duty to defend because of other provisions of the policy. The additional insured is subject to all of the terms, conditions and exclusion of the policy to the same extent as the Named Insured.

 

    1. HANDING IT BACK TO THE ADDITIONAL INSURED’S CARRIER
        1. Requiring A.I. Endorsements
        1. If the G.C.’s policy requires it to get A.I. endorsements, what is the insurer’s remedy when the suit comes in and the A.I. insurers contend they have no obligation? Almost always, the G.C. has good intentions: it uses a contract form, which requires A.I. coverage, and it collects Certificates of Insurance at least at the outset of the job. Unless the G.C. has the office staff with expertise to be fully savvy regarding insurance issues, the actual A.I. endorsements may not be collected, there may not have been demands for A.I. endorsements under the subcontractors? subsequent policies, or the subcontractor’s policy may turn out to have those pesky exclusions.
        1. Sometimes, even a G.C. who usually utilizes its own contract forms will do business based on a written bid or proposal from the subcontractor or supplier. Subcontractors usually don’t voluntarily commit to providing A.I. coverage, or if they do, it usually entails an extra charge.
        1. The G.C. usually does not purchase a policy with the intention of violating the requirement that it procure A.I. endorsements – if A.I. endorsements are not in place, it is usually a because of ineptness and a desire to get the work done, rather than a specific intent to violate a policy term. We doubt that an insurer could successfully avoid coverage if the G.C. made a reasonable (for a layperson) effort to require A.I. coverage from its subcontractors, but cannot get a defense from those additional insurers once suit is filed.
        1. Covering The G.C.’s Own Errors
        1. Assuming that the G.C. has procured Form 2010 11/85 endorsements from each of its subcontractors, does its own insurer owe an obligation to participate in the defense of the G.C.?
        1. Yes. Each additional insurer is obligated to provide a defense, but only with respect to its named insured’s work on behalf of the G.C.. If the G.C. is responsible for planning, design, scheduling or supervision of the project, it has undertaken work, which is not within the scope of any subcontractor’s work, for which it may be exposed to liability, and for which it is entitled to a defense. Thus, assuming there is a potential for coverage, the G.C.’s CGL insurers must also participate in the G.C.’s defense on the same basis as all of its additional insurers.
        1. Under the

      Presley

        1.  case (

      Presley Homes v. American States Ins. Co.

        1.  (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571), each insurer for a subcontractor owes a duty to defend the whole case. However, under

      Buss v. Superior Court

        1.  (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, the insurer may be entitled to obtain reimbursement at the end of the case for the costs of defending non-covered claims. Since the A.I. endorsements will not cover claims arising out of the G.C.’s own work, the G.C.’s own insurer needs to participate in the defense.
        1. The “Burning Limits” policy
        1. Some policies issued in recent years, particularly to large developers, have a single policy limit for both defense and indemnity costs. Other developers of numerous projects are finding their policy limits are close to exhaustion. Can a G.C.’s insurer, which is facing exhaustion of policy limits, refuse to participate in the defense or settlement of a case on the grounds that other claims will exhaust policy limits? Arguably, no. An insurer needs to indemnify its insured on each claim as it comes in, and not “save” the limits for another claim. If an additional insurer should be paying for the defense, and there is some clause making it primary, the G.C.’s insurer should seek reimbursement, but the bills (and settlement) must be paid until the policy limits are actually, not prospectively, exhausted.
        1. Responsibility Under Umbrella And Excess Policies
        1. If the primary policy has been exhausted by prior payments, does the excess insurer have to undertake the defense? It depends on the excess language. If the policy is identified as excess to specified primary policies, and is stated to be excess to those specific policies, it will have to step in when the specified primary policies have been exhausted.
        1. However, if the excess policy states that it is excess to “any” primary policy “available to the insured” the excess insurer can demand proof that

      all

        1.  of the A.I. policies have also exhausted before it must participate in the defense.

 

    1. THE DISAPPEARING SUBCONTRACTOR

        1. When Will A Policy Issued To A Successor Entity Cover The Prior Project?

      Ray v. Alad

        1.  (1977) 19 Cal.3d 22 held that there is successor liability for the defective products of a predecessor under certain circumstances. However, even when there is successor liability, there would not be coverage under the successor’s policies.

      Oliver Machinery Company v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company

        1.  (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 510, 517 refused to extend successor liability to insurance coverage for products manufactured by the predecessor company: “Coverage is a question of contract interpretation and the duty to defend is based on the subject insurance contract.? (See also,

      General Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court

        1.  (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1447.)
        1. If The Subcontractor Is Acquired, Does The Parent’s Policy Pick Up Liability, And Can You Go After The Parent’s Concurrent Policies?
        1. As a matter of corporate law, the parent company may have liability for acts of the subsidiary. However, the subsidiary does not thereby have coverage under the parent’s policy, unless it is specifically named as an insured or is a newly acquired entity. (

      Oliver Machinery Company v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company

        1.  (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 510, 517;

      Quemetco, Inc. v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co

        1.  (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 494);

      Cooper Companies v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.

        1.  (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1094;

      General Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Superior Court

        1. , (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th at 1454;

      Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

        1.  (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1.)

 

    1. Construction defect actions have a ten-year statute of limitations. Small businesses have an estimated 50% failure rate during their first five years. There is thus a 50/50 chance that the subcontractor will not be around when the lawsuit gets served. Those subcontractors who have survived may have changed their form of doing business (e.g., from individual to corporation), partnered with others in the same trade, or been bought out. Meanwhile, sometimes it seems like the insurer insolvency rate matches the small business failure rate.

 

    1. WHAT ABOUT INSURED CONTRACTS?

 

    1. Even if no A.I. coverage under a form 2010 11/85 endorsement can be located, all is not lost. It is almost unheard of for a subcontract requiring A.I. coverage not to also provide that the subcontractor will indemnify the G.C. This indemnity agreement may be an “insured contract” under the CGL policy, and if so, the insurer must indemnify the named insured for indemnifying the G.C.. Both defense costs and indemnity would come out of policy limits. The

Golden Eagle v. Insurance Company of the West

    1.  case ((2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 837) allows additional insurers to require equitable contribution from the insurers with insured contracts.

 

    1. CONCLUSION

      • A list of all of the documentation the G.C. should procure from the subcontractor prior to beginning work. The documents would include:
          1. fully signed copy of the subcontract.
          2. The Certificate of Insurance (see a. below)
          3. The Additional Insured endorsement.
          4. The Declarations page from the subcontractor’s policy.
      • The insurer could also provide
          1. An example of a properly prepared Certificate of Insurance with the proper language to convey A.I. coverage set forth.
          2. An exemplar copy of the acceptable form(s) of A.I. endorsement.
          3. A list of endorsements, which would be unacceptable. (Ideally, any unfamiliar endorsements would be procured and analyzed to determine whether they unreasonably restrict coverage.)
          4. A “tickler file” whereby the G.C. would keep track of the expiration dates of the subcontractors’ policies, and demand A.I. coverage under the following years’ policies.

 

    1. Additional insurance issues promise to be a source of contention into the foreseeable future. Proper documentation that additional insured coverage has been procured requires the G.C. to demand specific paperwork and then carefully evaluate it to make sure that the terms are not unduly exclusionary. Thus, somebody working for the G.C. must have some substantial insurance knowledge, or a good roadmap of what to look for. All of this interferes with the G.C.’s chief concern, which is completing the work as quickly and economically as possible.

 

    1. Insurers who sell coverage to G.C.s could assist their insureds and themselves by providing more specific information as to what those G.C.’s should obtain before allowing a subcontractor to work on their projects. At a minimum, that should include the following:

 

For those G.C.’s who still consider themselves “hammer and nails guys” and want nothing to do with all of this legal and insurance red tape, these procedures will seem onerous in the extreme. Probably few will ever complete a job with complete documentation of their insurance rights in hand. Thus, for the foreseeable future, insurers and attorneys will have to complete the documentation themselves, years after the fact, or find that the buck has stopped at their desk.


 

 

Playing Fair
The Defense Of Additional Insureds

By:  Carolyn Mathews

When it comes to allocating the cost of the defense and indemnity of an additional insured, the view is different from each side of the negotiating table.

  • THE “HOT POTATO” GAME:
    • From the view of the additional insured and its primary carriers, the AI carriers engage in inordinate delays while they play “hot potato” with the additional insured, its primary carrier, and the carriers for other subcontractors.
  • THE BULLY ON THE BLOCK:
    • From the view of the carriers for the various subcontractors, the process is wholesale bludgeoning with bullying tactics and threats.
      • Counsel for the additional insured developer/general contractor tenders its defense to every insurer of every subcontractor involved in the project, regardless of whether the homeowner plaintiffs are alleging any defects in the insured subcontractor’s work, whether an applicable AI endorsement exists, or whether the damage allegedly occurred after the policy was no longer in force.
      • The tender letter invariably demands that every subcontractor provide the additional insured with a “full and complete defense” and it cites portions of Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Ins. Co (June 2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571 and indemnity provisions of the subcontract.
      • The carrier has little or no information regarding the claim because counsel for the additional insured plays “hide the ball.” A copy of the AI endorsement, a copy of the complaint, a copy of the subcontract, a preliminary defect list, or a matrix of the completion dates of the homes at issue seldom accompany the tender letter. Moreover, counsel for the additional insured ignores the carrier’s calls and letters requesting those documents for months, if not years, after tendering the defense. Then they shoot off a letter that indignantly demands, upon threat of “bad faith” litigation, that the carrier “step up to the plate” and immediately pay all of the fees of and costs incurred by the attorneys selected by the insured
  • THE PRESLEY CASE:
    • Presley applies if the additional insured endorsement conforms to the holding in that case. The parties to the tender must look to the wording of both the policy and the additional insured endorsement to see if the language conforms to that interpreted by the Presley court.
      • The “full and complete defense” holding in Presley does not exonerate the developer/contractor’s primary insurer from an obligation to defend its insured. In fact, if a potential for coverage exists for the damages alleged, the developer/contractor’s primary insured owes its named insured a “complete defense.” Moreover, the Presley holding does not provide support for the refusal of the developer/general contractor’s primary insurer to arbitrarily lower its share of its insured’s defense fees and costs – although it is frequently being misused for that purpose.
      • Presley most certainly does not support primary carriers’ demands that AI carriers agree not to seek reapportionment. Nevertheless, that demand is now frequently made. Theoretically, an additional insured can tender solely to any single one of the AI carriers whose policy and endorsement provisions cover the damages sought by the homeowner/defendant, and that carrier will be obligated to provide a “full and complete” defense. However, the selected AI carrier can, and probably will, provide that defense through counsel of its own choosing and it can, and probably will, seek reapportionment and contribution from every other liable carrier, including the developer/general contractor’s primary carrier.
  • APPORTIONING DEFENSE COSTS:
    • Thoreau said, “Any fool can make a rule, and every fool will mind it. But the court’s rulings on apportionment between carriers recognize that you cannot put the same shoe on every foot.“
      • In Centennial Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 105, the court refused to establish a “bright line” equal share rule as the appropriate method for allocating defense costs among multiple liability insurance carriers. Citing Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1298, 1308, the court said a trial court must determine the method of allocation that “will most equitably distribute the obligation among the insurers ‘pro rata in proportion to their respective coverage of the risk’ as ‘a matter of distributive justice and equity.’”
      • The courts have adopted a number of ways of apportioning the burden among multiple insurers. The six methods most frequently employed are labeled.
        1. ”Time on the risk”
        2. “Policy limits”
        3. ”Combined time on the risk and policy limits”
        4. ”Premiums paid”
        5. ”Maximum loss method”
        6. ”Equal Share method”
  • THE TIERED APPROACH:
    • Prior to the ruling in Presley, carriers usually employed a tiered approach to allocating defense costs. In that approach the developer/contractor’s primary carrier was usually responsible for twenty-five to thirty percent of its insured’s defense costs, and the Ai carriers were placed in tiers with decreasing percentage responsibility.
    • For example:
      TIER ONE
      30%
      TIER TWO
      35%
      TIER THREE
      25%
      TIER FOUR
      10%
      Primary Carriers Roofing
      Rough Carpentry
      Sheet Metal
      Grading
      Waterproofing
      Finish Carpentry
      Electrical
      Plumbing
      Concrete
      Stucco
      Carpets
      Drywall
      Landscaping
      Door Knobs
      Fireplaces
    • The percentage assigned to each tier is divided among the number of subcontractors whose carriers accept the tender. If more than one carrier accepts for a particular subcontractor, they split the share allocated to that subcontractor.
  • THE EQUAL SHARES APPROACH:
      • With the advent of the Presley ruling, and the primary carriers unfounded interpretation that it relieved or lessened their burden with respect to the defense of their insured. Cost share agreements are more frequently based on an “equal share” allocation or a variation of that method referred to as “weighted equal shares.”
      • The “equal share” method is self-explanatory, i.e. an equal division of the defense costs assigned to the primary carrier and each subcontractor, regardless of whether the subcontractor installed hundreds of leaking roofs or merely supplied the doorknobs. Although this method hardly complies with the court’s requirement of “distributive justice and equity,” it is less onerous when numerous carriers have accepted the developer/general contractor’s tender.
      • In the “weighted equal share” method, the defense costs are still divided into equal shares, but some subcontractors are assigned more shares than others, depending upon the defects alleged by the plaintiffs. Although this method achieves a more equitable distribution among subcontractors, it still results in a greatly deceased burden on the primary carriers.

 

Survey of Recent Cases Involving Additional Insured Issues

By:  Bryan M. Weiss

In the past few years, a number of court decisions have been issued which impact the relationships between additional insureds, named insureds, insurance carriers and even insurance brokers. The following survey of cases summarizes those decisions and the impact each may have on the industry…

IV.      Contractual Liability Coverage and “Damages”

In Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 837, the court held that attorneys fees and costs incurred by an additional insured are “damages” falling within a policy’s contractual liability coverage and thus are included within an additional insurer’s indemnity obligation.

Facts:     D.J. Plastering (D.J.) was a subcontractor on several residential construction projects of Davidson Communities, Inc. The subcontractor required D.J. to “indemnify, defend and save harmless Contractor … from … any and all claims, demands, causes of action, damages, costs, expenses, losses or liabilities, in law or in equity, of every kind and nature whatsoever … arising out of or in any manner directly or indirectly connected with the work to be performed under this agreement, howsoever caused, regardless of any negligence of Contractor….” D.J. was insured under successive CGL policies issued by Golden Eagle, ICW and CIC. The policies covered D. J.’s liability for third party bodily injury or property damage claims, and D. J.’s assumption of the tort liability of prime contractors, such as Davidson, under indemnity agreements (contractual liability coverage). Davidson was also named as an additional insured on the ICW policies.

Homeowners brought several lawsuits against Davidson for construction defects Davidson cross-complained against its subcontractors, including D. J., for express indemnity and negligence. Davidson, as ICW’s additional named insured, tendered the defense of the action to ICW; it denied the request. Golden Eagle, ICW and CIC, all of which defended D.J. on Davidson’s cross-complaint, collectively settled D. J.’s indemnity exposure to Davidson for damages paid to the construction defect plaintiffs. D. J.’s obligation to indemnify Davidson for its attorney fees and costs in the underlying action was submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Davidson $605,374.25. Golden Eagle and ICW paid the award in equal shares. Golden Eagle then brought this action against ICW for declaratory relief, equitable contribution and equitable indemnity, seeking reimbursement of the amount it paid toward the arbitration award, on the ground that ICW was solely responsible for Davidson’s defense costs because it was an additional insured under the ICW policies.

The trial court granted Golden Eagle’s summary judgment motion, finding that Davidson’s defense costs in the underlying action were not “damages” within the meaning of the CGL policies, and thus D. J.’s liability for such costs under the indemnity agreements was not covered. The court determined that ICW breached its obligation to defend Davidson as an additional insured, and thus “in equity and good conscience ICW should reimburse [Golden Eagle]” for its payment of one-half of the arbitration award against D.J.

Holding on Appeal:     On appeal, ICW argued that the judgments must be reversed because the contractual liability provisions of the CGL policies of Golden Eagle, CIC and ICW cover D. J.’s liability for Davidson’s defense costs in the underlying action, and the three insurers should contribute equally to satisfying the arbitration award. All policies in question provided contractual liability coverage, wherein the policies covered damages assumed by the named insured pursuant to a contract. The court first noted that under the subcontracts in question, D.J. expressly assumed the tort liability of Davidson for property damage claims of third persons. Accordingly, the subcontracts were insured contracts within the meaning of the CGL policies. ICW contended that given the contractual liability coverage, the policies should be interpreted to include Davidson’s defense costs in the underlying action as sums D.J. became “legally obligated to pay as damages because of” property damage. Golden Eagle and CIC countered that the defense costs are not covered because the policies’ definitions of insured contract refer only to the assumption of tort liability and do not expressly include the assumption of defense costs. The court disagreed, noting that the term “damages” as used in the insuring clauses of the Golden Eagle and CIC policies is not defined, and given the contractual liability coverage of the policies, the term could reasonably be interpreted to include the indemnitee’s costs in defending against third party claims for covered property damages. The court concluded that an insured with contractual liability coverage would reasonably expect that the indemnitee’s attorney fees and costs are sums the insured becomes “legally obligated to pay as damages because of” covered tort claims.” Davidson suffered “detriment” or “loss” by incurring attorney fees and costs as a direct result of third party claims for property damage arising from D. J.’s work, and the arbitration award on the indemnity agreement is monetary compensation therefor.

Comments:   The importance of this case is its emphasis on the contractual liability coverage of a CGL policy. Where a named insured has entered into an “insured contract” with another entity, whereby it agrees to assume that entity’s tort liability, the contractual liability coverage of the policy obligates the insurer to indemnify its named insured for damages incurred by the other entity. This case extends those obligations to the indemnitee’s defense costs as well, not just its “damages” from an indemnity standpoint.

The above are excerpts from Murchison & Cumming’s presentation entitled “Passing the Buck.” If you would like to receive a complete copy of these articles as published in the West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar Program, please contact Arleen Milian at (213) 623-7400 or by email at amilian@murchisonlaw.com.